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 “The shift from reliance on specialized portfolio lenders financed by deposits to a greater use of capital 
markets represented the second great sea change in mortgage finance, equaled in importance only by the 
events of the New Deal.” 
 
FRB Chairman Ben Bernanke 
August 31, 20072 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: From New Deal Institutions to Capital Markets 
 
At the tail end of 2006, the ‘subprime’ hit the news with a bang when default rates shot 
up in a segment of mortgage finance that had previously received little attention in 
mainstream reporting.  Against rising central bank interest rates, and following the 
collapse of the housing bubble, borrowers bearing certain high-risk classes of loans 
ceased to maintain their repayment schedules.  By the turn of 2007, the unanticipated 
inability of lenders to raise enough capital from borrowers impeded their own instalment 
payments to international residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) holders.  Major 
subprime lenders declared bankruptcy and several high profile hedge funds imploded.  
As regularized transnational circuits of capital flow broke down in the space of only a 
few months, the problem escalated into a financial credit crunch that soon took on global 
proportions.  This series of all too recent and as yet ongoing events has made evident the 
long chain of financial connections that have come to co-ordinate the economic agencies 
of ordinary U.S. homeowners with those of international capital investors.   
 
Those working at the intersection of ‘social studies of finance’ and ‘social studies of 
accounting’ (Miller, 2008) might immediately suspect that instabilities in the segment 
named ‘subprime’ have been accompanied by important organizational and 
infrastructural changes whose underlying significance, through disruption, are perhaps 
only now coming to light.  One of the most dramatic of these transformations has 
occurred in the business of mortgage finance which sits at the nexus between the markets 
for real estate and those for asset backed securities.  As emphasized by Federal Reserve 
                                                 
2 Remarks made by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Economic 
Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 31, 2007.  The text is available online at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2007/20070831/default.htm. 
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Board Chairman Ben Bernanke in a speech responding to current events in the last ten 
years (quoted above), U.S. mortgage finance has shifted from an industry driven by 
government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and specialized deposit-funded lenders, to an 
industry fuelled in large part by high-risk investment capital.  No longer the purview of 
local banks and savings co-operatives, consumer mortgages have become the asset class 
feeding some of the most popular debt securities for sale on Wall Street. 
 
The shift towards the unfettered involvement of private capital in mortgage lending and 
its downstream effects are becoming widely recognized in the U.S.  A New York Times 
Magazine contributor who had just received a letter informing him that his mortgage 
obligations were being transferred to another financial group, expressed his personal 
sense of shock in this way: “…it came to me as a thunderous revelation: my debts were 
some other people’s assets” (Kirn, 2006).   In this spirit, the movement towards big 
capital has been tied to many of the most cited reasons in mainstream commentary for 
how mortgage credit became unsustainably amplified in the last few years.  The profit 
driven interests of investment banks and hedge funds have ostensibly encouraged 
unscrupulous and irrational lending, fraudulent income reporting, a reduced 
responsibility towards the personal situation of borrowers.  This was compounded by a 
naïve borrowing in the face of increasingly complex financing options and negligence on 
the part of the federal agencies who should have been protecting consumers from 
predatory lending.   Critiques such as these have been deployed in the style of a classic 
‘sociology of errors’ (Bloor, 1991), in which deviations from a retrospectively appropriate 
course of action are rooted out and condemned.   
 
Analyses of technical systems that focus on (human) error are fundamentally 
‘asymmetric’ because they are confined to situations of breakdown or crisis.  This is why 
the post hoc denunciation of deleterious actions triggered by this new brand of mortgage 
finance reads like a stale list of ‘the usual suspects’ – the ones that are routinely rolled out 
whenever there is an issue with crushing consumer indebtedness (Black, 1961).  This kind 
of reasoning leaves us open to two popular poles of argumentation: either to the 
ideologically driven conclusion that the current financial crisis is due to the natural 
excesses of free-marketeering run amock; to a ‘contagious’ psychology of ‘irrational 
exuberance’ (Shiller, 2005; 2008); or to a moralistic accusation that investment bankers 
allowed themselves to be seized by a greed-induced passion that temporarily overcame 
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their otherwise sound economic good sense.  Either way, these perspectives sidestep the 
pressing contemporary question of how a financial network for lending so freely has 
come into being.  Crisis or no crisis they fail to provide a compelling account of how 
these private capital players have managed to encroach, in practice, upon a marketplace 
the federal government has had to actively sustain, through specialized government 
sponsored agencies, since the New Deal.  If government charters were once necessary to 
make the connections for liquid mortgage finance to exist – and in particular for making 
mortgage funding available to credit strapped populations – a move towards financial 
markets that sidesteps these entities cannot be sufficiently explained by a spontaneous 
ramping up of credit volume through supply and demand; and even less so by some kind 
of natural willingness among capital investors to cater to a consumer segment called the 
‘subprime’.   
 
How has mortgage finance been rendered open to the practices of high-risk investment 
that appeal to big capital players?  Surely, something might be said about the genesis and 
development3 of subprime finance as a novel network of investment grade lending in and 
of itself.  It is perhaps of interest, then, to take a step back from the collapse and to 
investigate the implementation of new calculative infrastructures and their consequences 
on how mortgage finance is arranged.  To track such a change means taking up the 
painstaking search into the most mundane of details so familiar to social studies of 
science (Bowker & Star, 2000; Star, 1999) and of accountancy (Hopwood, 1987; 
Hopwood & Miller, 1994); it means exploring the innovations that have re-configured 
markets, their machineries and their places (Beunza & Stark, 2004; Çalişkan, 2007; Guala, 
2001; Muniesa, 2000; Zaloom, 2006).  In the case of the diffused industry of mortgage 
finance it means prying into the everyday apparatuses of underwriting and into the rise of 
consumer risk management techniques that have permitted a dramatic production of 
increased liquidity.  Such an analysis would conclude that understanding subprime 
lending is less about unravelling the motivations and psychologies that might lead to 
financial overextension, than it is about understanding the development of technical 
apparatuses that have supported the practical activities of a new cadre of financial agents 
(Hopwood, 2000). 
 
                                                 
3 The term ‘genesis and development’ is borrowed from the work of Ludwig Fleck, a classic text on the 
establishment of scientific facts in science studies (Fleck, 1981) 
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Instead of questioning why so much mortgage credit was extended to borrowers at a 
high-risk of defaulting; instead of conflating the crisis with a set of culturally familiar 
categories such as the ‘poor’ or the ‘economically vulnerable’; instead of presuming to 
know what it is that is collapsing and offering calculatively empty, off-the-shelf reasons 
for why, this paper traces the technical constitution of an investment subprime – at once 
a class of consumers, a set of ‘exotic’ mortgage products, and a class of mortgage backed 
securities – as a viable and fluid network of high-stakes financial action.  It may be 
helpful to note that generating financial action of this type is substantially more 
complicated problem than single market formation (see, for example (Garcia-Papet, 
2007)).  In the case of mortgages, making debts fungible involves numerous transactions 
crosscutting what might be considered four distinct markets arenas:  First, there is market 
for real estate where home buyers and sellers meet to exchange property.  Next, there is 
the market for loans, where homebuyers receive credit from financial institutions.  Third, 
there is the point of exchange between mortgage brokers and wholesalers who pool 
loans.4  Finally, there is the secondary market where pools of these mortgages are 
packaged by securitizing bodies and sold off to international investors as financial 
products.  For the full circuit to function, money or credit flows transversally in one 
direction while what is known as ‘paper’ in the industry, or debt, flows in the other.  This 
is an extraordinary problem of coordination that demands much more than single 
interface where buyers and sellers meet. 
 
Consistent assessment is central to framing financial exchanges.  (In the absence of 
sustained calculation no financial action is possible, and there is little or no secondary 
mortgage market.)  To create liquidity in any circuit of mortgage finance – government 
sponsored or otherwise – numerous agents must come to similar understandings of the 
value of the asset backed paper so that it can be successive transferred between market 
participants.  If the overarching problem is to organize heterogeneous actors to agree 
upon the qualities of goods (Callon, 1998a; Callon, Méadel & Rabeharisoa, 2002), then 
there is strong reason to suspect that the recent explosion of secondary subprime 
financial activity is the result of a process thorough which a novel chain of mortgage 
valuation has been put into place.  Rather than assuming that calculation is a monolithic 
means to market organization, however, this research takes for granted that calculative 
activities are by nature disorderly – that is, that at the outset, there are as many potential 
                                                 
4 For a detailed account of this particular market interface see (Bitner, 2008). 
 5
solutions to a problem of valuation as there are participating agents.  From this position, 
stories about paradigmatic shifts towards quantification, models, or risk management are 
inadequate explanations, for even if such movements could spontaneously occur, it is 
unlikely that agents working on a calculative problem independently, from different 
fields, would spontaneously come to the same evaluative results.   
 
To understand unprecedented subprime liquidity the empirical concern is to document 
the work that has been done to selectively reduce calculative multiplicity, particularly with 
regards to low quality loans.  Instead of taking the uniformity of calculative frames from 
real estate to the secondary markets for granted, this paper will explore the importation 
of a distributed calculative (Hutchins, 1995) analytic apparatus into mortgage origination.  
In 1995, the GSE known by its nickname, ‘Freddie Mac’, adopted a commercially 
available consumer risk assessment tool called a FICO® credit bureau score which was 
originally designed to control risk in consumer credit (credit cards, small loans etc.).  At 
that time, Freddie’s goal was simple and clear: it wanted to standardize underwriting 
practices in federally sanctioned, prime mortgage lending by introducing a consistent 
means of screening credit risk into its newly automated system.  The paper follows the 
gradual, sequential and material movement5 of this specific risk management tool, the 
FICO®, as it spread from the GSEs throughout mortgage finance.  It documents how, in 
redefining the calculation of prime quality, commercial scores simultaneously provided 
an expression of non-prime quality whose quantitative granularity was unprecedented. 
 
What this account intriguingly suggests is that the displacement of the New Deal 
institutions through the activation of capital players is not a result of inaction or 
inattention on the part of GSE managers.  To the contrary, the intensification of high-
risk lending has been built out of the GSE’s very own initiatives to wrest calculative 
control over mortgage finance.6  The key word is ‘built’.  The GSE’s authoritative 
endorsement of a particular commercial solution to the problem of consumer credit risk 
assessment created the conditions of its widespread adoption.  But this alone did not 
guarantee that all players would resort to the same risk management tool.  Once marked 
                                                 
5 In an era where information transmission can seem effortless, the term ‘material’ is used to emphasize 
that the transfer of consumer credit scores packaged and sold as a commercial product comes with 
important monetary as well as organizational costs.  It further signals that this movement is sequential 
rather than instantaneous, that it passes through physical media, rather than through a generalized 
culture or human cognitive capacity; and that it leaves behind traces that can be empirically followed. 
6 For a key statement on how the state and accounting might be analyzed as mutually constitutive see 
(Miller & Rose, 1997). 
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by the government agencies’ authoritative interpretation and entrenched in their newly 
automated underwriting software, continuous infrastructural investment had to be made 
to ensure that FICO® scores would be taken up and used in similar ways across the 
industry.  Ratings agencies such as Standard & Poor’s would, in turn, play an active role 
in stifling calculative diversity by translating the FICO® into non-government channels 
for securitization.   
 
The establishment of FICO® as a common calculative tool in mortgage making lead to 
clear changes in lending practices.  As the paper will further show, once a common 
interpretation of these scores was achieved, a gradual shift away from traditional, 
exclusionary practices of credit control-by-screening and towards gradated practices of credit 
control-by-risk occurred.  Where subprime lending required overriding the very judgment 
that was central to control-by-screening (since by definition a subprime loan was a mortgage 
that has been screened out), in a regime of control-by-risk, subprime lending became an 
exercise in risk management within a newly created space of calculative possibility.  
Under control-by-risk, managerial decision making was no longer confined to approving or 
withholding loans, but was extended to the exploitation of stabilized grades of credit 
quality accessed through scores to create multiple borrowing options tailored to 
accommodate varying levels of risk.  This point is pivotal.  It is through this calculative 
shift, enacted through FICO®, that the original GSE markets were circumvented by the 
development of a second, infrastructurally distinct circuit of high-risk mortgage 
investment known as the ‘subprime’. 
 
  
 
Tracking FICO® credit bureau scores  
 
Work on financial markets is only one part of a broader research movement towards an 
anthropology of markets that considers exchange as the outcome of intensive processes 
of economic formatting7 (Callon, 1991; 1998b; Callon & Çalişkan, forthcoming).  
                                                 
7 The term ‘economic formatting’ might be thought of as a less cumbersome term for what Callon has 
also called ‘economization’.  It refers to the process through which activities, arrangements and 
behaviours are qualified as ‘economic’.  Because Callon argues that there are multiple definitions of 
what is economic and that these are perpetually under construction, controversy and maintenance, cases 
of economic formatting can only be identified empirically according to the definitions that actors 
themselves deploy for what constitutes an economic situation. 
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Although the social studies of finance8 as a movement is perhaps broader than influential 
science and technology studies renditions would have it (compare (Godechot, 2001) to 
(MacKenzie, 2006)) an attentiveness to technologies of calculation – both mathematical 
and non-mathematical variants (Callon & Muniesa, 2002) –  has certainly been central to 
work in this field.  Calculation comes into play in retail markets (Cochoy & 
Grandclément, 2006; Lave, 1988; Lave, Murtaugh & de la Rocha, 1984) or labor markets 
(Godechot, 2006), among others, but it plays a special role in finance where the products 
being exchanged are not only the objects of calculation, but are in and of themselves (as 
with securities and derivative products) mathematical derivations based on underlying 
commodities, risk estimates or indices (Lépinay, 2007; Millo, 2007).  This is why the 
investigation of a financial market is often enmeshed with an anthropology of calculation, 
an exercise in tracking the history and circulation of facts, figures and formulas9.   
 
Tracking calculative objects can be an extremely fruitful method for following the 
constitution of the financial products as well as the coordinated assessment of their 
qualities, around which are configured market forms (Lépinay, 2002; MacKenzie, 2003; 
Muniesa, 2000). The case of consumer credit scoring in the U.S. is a case in point.  Credit 
scoring originally referred to a number of statistical techniques used for predicting credit 
risk that produced a credit score: the punctual empirical assessment of the odds that a 
consumer might default on a loan expressed as a probability.  Over time the term has 
been diffracted in two directions: scoring techniques have been extended beyond default 
predictions to address such questions as the likelihood that a consumer might respond to 
a marketing campaign or generate revenue by making use of the revolving function on a 
credit card; and secondly, among credit data analysts, scoring has come to loosely refer to 
any system that produces a rank ordering of a population of credit consumers even if this 
does not involve strict probabilities or numerical scores.   
                                                 
8 SSF is also much narrower than the field of economic sociology (Smelser & Swedberg, 1994; 
Swedberg, 2003) although it might be brought into relationship with the sociology of markets 
(Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2007).  For a statement on the ‘sociology of financial markets’, see (Knorr Cetina 
& Preda, 2005).  For an early sociological take on financial markets that predates the SSF movement 
see (Adler & Adler, 1984; Baker, 1984).  Several research networks have been organized to support 
work in SSF.  Donald MacKenzie’s ESRC professorial fellowship sponsors a researcher’s list and 
conferences for the U.K. (see: http://www.sociology.ed.ac.uk/finance/index.html).  The Social Studies of 
Finance Network (see: http://www.ssfn.org/) run out of the LSE’s Department of Information Systems is 
partnered to the French network ‘Association d'Etudes Sociales de la Finance’ (see: http://ssfa.free.fr/) 
at the Centre for the Sociology of Innovation, Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris.  In the 
U.S., the website for the Social Studies of Finance conference hosted by David Stark at the Center on 
Organizational Innovation (COI, New York, 3-4 May, 2002) has also served as an important resource. 
9 Much excellent work in science and technology studies has been devoted to tracing the history and 
circulations of things, tools and technologies (Clarke & Fujimura, 1992; Daston, 2000; Kohler, 1994; 
Latour, 1987; Levinson, 2006; Rheinberger, 1997).   
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 The proliferation of credit scoring activity in backstage banking has come to the attention 
of several social scientists concerned about a paradigmatic shift towards quantitative risk 
management in consumer finance (Guseva & Rona-Tas, 2001; Leyshon & Thrift, 1999; 
Marron, 2007)10.  But what distinguishes these studies from those in the social studies of 
finance is that they do not treat scoring pragmatically as a set of concrete systems worthy 
of detailed exploration so much as they exploit it as a terrain on which to theorize 
grander themes such as rationalization, quantification, discipline and governance.  
Because credit scoring is portrayed as an example of a larger movement, these studies 
tend to put aside the formal properties of technical systems.  Analysing technologies in 
terms of how they fit into bigger pictures means taking for granted the significance of a 
trajectory of innovation that shapes specific tools.  Yet, from a science and technology 
studies inspired perspective, it is within the details of these processes that the formal 
calculative properties of technical systems – in and of themselves the potential agents of 
change – are created and established.   
 
As I have discussed elsewhere the distinctive properties of the credit scoring system in 
the U.S. are very much a product of idiosyncratically unfolding processes (Poon, 2007).  
Credit scoring is not only body of statistical methods that is being applied within 
financial institutions to assemble and digest consumer credit information into a decision 
making tool; it is also a thriving industry for ‘analytics’ in which a range of consumer risk 
management products designed and marketed by specialized firms circulate with 
stabilized contents as commercial goods.  These firms may have little or no ability to 
generate consumer data on their own, but each one possesses a delicate savoir-faire (De 
Certeau, Giard & Mayol, 1998), a prized ‘way of doing’ based on accumulated experience, 
artisanal skills, and in-house software that allows practitioners to exploit credit 
information and fix the results of their analysis into applications suited for business 
decision-making.  The broader research project this piece is taken from traces the U.S. 
origins of an industry for credit analytics.  This industry began in the late 1950’s with the 
pioneering efforts of a single firm – Fair, Isaac & Company Incorporated (today, Fair 
                                                 
10 For an exploration of the equivalent practices of risk calculation in corporate finance see (Kalthoff, 
2005).  It is interesting to note that commercial lending is much less quantified than U.S. consumer 
lending. 
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Isaac Corporation) 11 – to sell ‘custom application scorecards’, a statistical tool originally 
adapted to the needs of finance companies.12     
 
The commercial basis of credit scoring provides a unique opportunity for understanding 
the material transfer, that is, the step-by-step movement from one location to the next, of 
risk management practices and information.  Similar to the way in which formulas issued 
from academic scientists might bear the signature of their author(s) – the Black-Sholes-
Merton option pricing formula is a key example of this – proprietary credit scoring 
models made by credit analytics providers will bear the brand mark of their maker.  This 
means that many of the tools for the statistical analysis of credit data have an 
independent and distinctly traceable origin from the more diffuse and maverick methods 
for data mining into which credit scoring as a practice is currently being subsumed.  The 
most celebrated invention issued from this fruitful circumstance of corporate innovation 
is called a ‘credit bureau score’.  A U.S. bureau score is any consumer credit risk estimate 
that is calculated using individual level credit (and repayment) information compiled and 
periodically refreshed from a number of sources, such as revolving credit card lines, small 
personal loans and auto financing.13  Financial institutions issuing credit, regardless of 
their contribution to the data pool, can purchase commercial risk scores, available in 
several distinct brands from each bureau, as a generic tool that aids in evaluating the 
overall credit risk of an individual borrower. 
 
The strength of the bureau scores as risk management aids is that they give competitive 
lending firms equal access to general snapshots of the consumer that are continuously 
                                                 
11 Research for the author’s PhD dissertation on the history of credit scoring technology (University of 
California San Diego, expected 2009) began with a series of over thirty open-ended, face-to-face 
interviews carried out between June 2004 and October 2005.  Respondents were (predominantly) 
former Fair Isaac personnel, including executives, analysts, project managers, sales people, and 
technical and administrative support staff contacted through snowball sampling.  Only two of the 
interviews are quoted directly in this piece.  The remaining data presented here were collected between 
January and August 2007 from a variety of trade journals, government documents, regulatory manuals, 
newspapers, and online sources. 
12 The original Fair Isaac scorecards were custom crafted algorithmic tools designed to capture patterns 
of default in firm-level consumer credit data.  The tool rendered scoring possible at the point of retail 
sale by representing the algorithm as sets of figures to be added on a printed card.  Today, scorecards 
are no longer visible as they have been embedded into electronic systems.  Although Fair Isaac continues 
to be a leader in the field, they face increasing competitive pressure from rival providers as well as 
from in-house analytics groups.  For a general account of their methods by a former company executive, 
see (Lewis, 1992). 
13 Credit bureau data can be negative (default information), or positive (repayment information).  U.S. 
bureaus keep both kinds.  There are other major data gathering operations in business that compile 
consumer credit histories and provide other marketing services (such as preparing direct solicitation 
mailing lists), but by strict definition a U.S. bureau sells actual credit histories and is subject to the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) 15 U.S.C § 1581 et seq. 
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recalculated as new data is amassed from participating lenders.  Such scores are by no 
means produced from an ‘ideal’ data set.  They are parasitic and pragmatic constructions 
that make the most of information that is readily available at the bureaus as a resource 
for manufacturing pre-packaged analytic products.  These black-boxed statistical figures 
are in large part ‘behavioural scores’.  They do not seek to qualify static qualities of the 
person so much as they constitute a temporally responsive picture of consumer risk that 
is useful for tracking a person’s ongoing relationship to credit.  Unlike classic ‘application 
scores’ which use data provided directly by a consumer on a form, it is noteworthy that 
bureau scores are calculated in the absence of input on income, occupation, or socio-
demographic characteristics, even the ones that may legally be considered, because this 
kind of data is simply too costly to be accessed and reliably maintained by the bureaus.   
 
Beyond the fact that bureau scores exist, there is an additional and important peculiarity 
about the U.S. market for scores.  Through an unexpected business configuration 
achieved by Fair Isaac, three statistically distinct proprietary scoring algorithms were put 
in place at Trans Union, Equifax, and Experian, the three major credit bureaus.  As a 
result of these joint ventures similar scores are manufactured by these otherwise highly 
competitive organizations under a common FICO® brand-label.  The FICO® line of 
scores numerically tags an estimated 75% of the U.S. population eligible for consumer 
credit on a linear scale of 300-850 units, trademarked by Fair Isaac.  The robustness and 
penetrance of the pan-bureau ‘product’ with its high substitutability and low switching 
costs explains why, in a situation where product proliferation and heavy competition 
among multiple, sui generis statistical solutions would otherwise be expected, there exists 
instead, a single analytic product that saturates the market for scores.  The co-ordinating 
effects of this widely circulating piece of ‘economic information’ (Callon, 2002) are 
significant: the overwhelming commercial success of this tool is arguably what has given 
recent U.S. consumer credit markets their coherence, confluence and vibrancy.14 
 
As the FICO® has travelled across financial institutions it has become a distinctive market 
device (Callon & Muniesa, 2002; Callon, Muniesa & Millo, 2007a), that is, it is a traceable 
                                                 
14 This argument is made in the author’s PhD dissertation.  Moving through several iterations of the 
technology as it emerged from the activities of Fair, Isaac and Company Incorporated beginning in 
1957, this research shows how consumer credit scoring has gradually became the information 
infrastructure sustaining multiple U.S. consumer credit markets.  The work culminates with an analysis of 
how scoring has participated in generating the current credit crisis, largely triggered by calculative 
overflows of risk within the consumer credit sector. 
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technological system involved in aligning the decision-making of lenders with regards to 
the qualities of borrowers.  A market device is any distributed technological arrangement 
that participates in the production of calculative agencies that are firm enough to render a 
singular qualification of market goods and therefore sustain the coming together of 
agents in acts of exchange (for a number of concise case studies see (Callon, Muniesa & 
Millo, 2007b)).  In short, a market device is a social scientific concept for identifying 
objects of investigation whose analysis can demonstrate that “Calculation is neither a 
universally homogeneous attribute of humankind, nor an anthropological fiction” (Callon 
et al., 2007a, p 5).  The implication of this provocative phrase is that market devices are 
by no means technologically determined, that is to say, they do not exist prior to their 
own implementation in actual practice.  Nor can devices be reduced to discrete 
technologies.  That technologies become market devices is achieved by active translation 
(Callon, 1986) through which they are adjusted, interpreted, modified, reworked, 
extended and distributed to become the bedrock of a collective calculative infrastructure.    
 
Before their use in mortgage making, the FICO® scores had already become a genuine 
market device in the wider U.S. consumer credit markets (personal loans, credit cards, 
retailer credit).  Their circulation had singularized calculations of consumer risk and had 
considerably reified the position of the consumer into a highly governable person (Miller 
& O'Leary, 1987; 1994) in those markets.  Commercial scores give lending institutions 
access to a common viewpoint on the consumer; they assign individuals a routinely 
updated placement in a shared cartography of the marketplace.  It is in large part through 
these scores (assisted by a smattering of other scoring tools), that the competitive basis of 
consumer credit have undergone a dramatic turn from one set of calculative agencies into 
quite another.  Over the past few decades, consumer credit markets have progressively 
moved away from blunt forms of profitability based on tighter consumer selection – credit 
control-by-screening characterized by simple but rigid barriers of exclusion designed to sift 
for acceptable credit quality; and towards razor sharp segmentation games that demand 
superior product matching – credit control-by-risk characterized by a segmented 
accommodation of varying credit qualities.  To remain competitive, consumer finance 
operations must do additional statistical work to refine the risk estimates produced by 
FICO®, supplementing these with in-house data and subtle re-calculation.  But this does 
not undermine the fundamental effect that shared commercial risk scores have had on 
co-ordinating lenders’ overall vision of an accessible population, as well as for stimulating 
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strategies of product design and targeted marketing.  The result is a risk segmented and 
saturated U.S. market for consumer credit. 
 
Credit scoring is a prime example of how numbers might matter to market activity not so 
much because of what they represent and whether they represent accurately, but because 
of what they enable agents to do (Vollmer, 2007).  From a perspective that is sensitive to 
the generative capacities15 of calculative tools in action, it should come as no surprise that 
the movement of a tool such as the FICO®, from consumer credit into the mortgage 
finance16, might provoke the configuration of a specific set of economic agencies 
heretofore unseen in mortgage making.  A method that has therefore proved useful for 
making the emergence of these agencies visible is to track the details of the scores’ 
movement through their uptake by the government sponsored agencies and out into 
mortgage making infrastructures.  (For clarity, the handful of institutions involved is 
described in Table 1.)  As this research will show, the government agencies’ interpretation 
of how to use the tool, once impressed upon the scores, has lead to the bipartite 
organization of today’s U.S. mortgage markets into the conventional prime and high-risk 
subprime.  Grasping the scores’ bubbling potential to reconfigure the calculative 
underpinnings of the mortgage markets, however, first requires an understanding of how 
credit quality was previously assessed by the GSEs in the absence of circulating 
numerical consumer credit scores.   
 
 
 
Government sponsored mortgage market making 
 
In the U.S., homeownership is not just a part of the ‘American Dream’; it is also actively 
facilitated by specialized state initiated institutions.  Since the Great Depression, the U.S. 
federal government has played an important role in making a liquid and stable mortgage 
market (Carruthers & Stinchcombe, 1999).  As part of the New Deal, the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) was started in 1934 to provide guaranteed insurance to 
                                                 
15 A distinction should be made here between the notion of ‘capacities’ and that of ‘generative 
capacities’ with regard to technology.  Generative capacities are possibilities that inhere in technical 
systems, but they are not developed without continued enrolment and innovation.  In the current case, the 
possibility of risk based pricing inheres within credit scoring but is not necessarily expressed if users do 
not develop this capability through additional innovation.  The GSEs for instance, do not. 
16 In U.S. economic reporting loans secured by real estate have traditionally been treated separately 
from consumer credit, the latter referring to retail credit, credit cards, small loans, and car financing.  
The distinction reflects the different institutional pathways through which these kinds of credit are 
originated.  
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mortgages, and the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) in 1938 to create a 
government assisted market for loans.  In 1968, the FNMA was transformed from a 
government owned body into a government sponsored enterprise (GSE), changing its 
name to ‘Fannie Mae’.  A second GSE, ‘Freddie Mac’ (Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation, FHLMC), was created in 1970.17  Freddie’s charter demanded that it 
“promote access to mortgage credit throughout the Nation (including central cities, rural 
areas, and underserved areas)”.   
 
The enterprises were created to fulfil an equalizing and democratizing function.  From 
the 1970’s on, the stated mechanism by which it was to accomplish this mission was “by 
increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments and improving the distribution of 
investment capital available for residential mortgage financing”. 18  The federal 
government’s intention was that the GSEs would ‘attract private capital for public 
purpose’, serving as a kind of ‘institutional market maker’19 by liaising homeowners 
borrowing funds to buy houses in the primary markets to capital holders seeking 
investment opportunities in the secondary markets.  The GSEs were not intended to 
make loans like banks.  Rather, their purpose was to facilitate the movement of debts in 
one direction in order to generate renewed funds in the other, either by purchasing and 
holding, or packaging and selling, financial instruments called mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS).  Considered a type of bond, the original GSE-MBS was a simple pool of 
                                                 
17 Through a statutory process the GSEs were placed in conservatorship on September 7, 2008 by the 
freshly created regulatory body, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).  The move was an effort 
to stem the systemic impact of their increasing weakness on the ongoing credit crisis.  Treasury Secretary 
Paulson has argued that because they are federally chartered but publicly traded, profit-oriented 
corporations, “only Congress can address the inherent conflict of attempting to serve both shareholders 
and a public mission” (Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. on Treasure and Federal Housing Finance Agency 
Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers, September 7, 2008. The text is available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm).  At the time they were created the GSEs were 
intended “to overcome then-existing legal and institutional impediments to the flow of funds for housing” 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2003, p1).  Initially they did so by issuing debt securities, but they also 
became major investors in private mortgage securities, purchasing 13% of all of products produced in 
2006 and 2007.  For a detailed description of how these agencies have operated as well as of the 
recent spate of challenges they have faced see (Frame & White, 2007).  
18 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act January 2005 12 U.S.C.1451 Sec. 301 4.  It is 
noteworthy that the original FNMA did not securitize loans but purchased and held them (Sarah Quinn, 
personal communication). 
19 The technical definition of a ‘market maker’ in finance is an exchange member who is positioned to 
take responsibility for making the market.  These figures are obligated to buy and sell from their own 
account when ever there is an excess of orders in either direction.  For a detailed description of this 
profession see (Abolafia, 1997).  The term is employed only loosely here.   
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conforming mortgages called a ‘single class pass-through’ (Adelson, 2004), which was 
calculated to yield a certain percentage as they matured.20   
 
To understand the reasons for the GSEs it is important to recognize that the default state 
of debts is inertial.  As a part of their production, debts are entangled in managerial rules, 
institutional relationships, and local processes of decision making.  A recent handbook 
on asset securitization by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) explains, 
“in the days before securities, banks were essentially portfolio lenders; they held loans 
until they matured or were paid off”.  Under this arrangement loans, including 
mortgages, “were funded by deposits, and sometimes by debt, which was a direct 
obligation of the bank (rather than a claim on specific assets)” (Comptroller of the 
Currency, 1997, p 2).   A securities market only works, then, providing that debts can be 
converted into mobile and transferable goods whose qualities buyers and sellers can 
come to agree upon in the present, even though these qualities will only be expressed in 
the future.  The value of a simple MBS, its quality, depended on the credit risk (estimated 
rate of default) and the prepayment risk (estimated rate of payment in advance of the due 
date) of the pooled assets, as either event could decrease the eventual return to the 
investor.  The need to assess these qualities explains why specialized agencies were 
required to provide the production function necessary to bring securitization and the 
liquidity advantages that accompany it into being.21   
 
In the securities markets, this function has belonged in large part to third party ratings 
providers such as Standard & Poor’s, alongside Fitch’s and Moody’s (Sinclair, 2005).  The 
system of credit rating they manufacture is an important financial indicator.  Ratings 
describe the overall quality of pools of loans underlying debt securities such as bonds and 
other financial instruments issued from private companies or even from nation states 
(treasury bonds).  Like information printed on packaging (Cochoy, 2002), performance 
testing to report on products in a consumer magazine (Mallard, 2007), or classifications 
                                                 
20 For a lively description of the early problems in organizing a mortgage backed bond market in the 
1980’s see (Lewis, 1990), a engaging memoir of the writer’s days in the employment of Solomon 
Brothers. 
21 The advantage of MBSs for lenders is that they provide more liquidity than keeping primary loans on 
the books.  Today, securitization has come to be seen as increasingly financially desirable because these 
carry lower capital requirements under Basel, which in turn “improves return on capital by converting an 
on-balance-sheet lending business into an off-balance-sheet fee income stream that is less capital 
intensive” (Comptroller of the Currency, 1997, p 4).  While this paper considers the translation of 
default risk into commercial numerical scores, it is noteworthy that uncertainty surrounding prepayment 
risk was controlled contractually in subprime finance through the imposition of heavy penalty fees. 
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of grain that allow different growers to merge their stocks (Cronon, 1992, p 97-119), 
ratings are what allow investors to know something about the contents of investments so 
they can decide what to buy.  Providing standardizing information about mortgage 
holders in the days before individual level credit bureau scores was a challenge, and 
“investors and other market participants faced greater difficulties in comparing the 
riskiness of loans from different lenders” (Adelson, 2004, p 5).   While the ratings 
agencies are experts in the process of evaluating the credit risk of million dollar asset 
pools, nation states, and large corporations, they have traditionally not been attuned to 
fine processes of rating individual mortgage consumers.  For this reason, even they have 
had to follow behind the authoritative market making guidelines set by the GSEs.22   
 
The government agencies have therefore had to serve as an all-in-one expert and 
organizational solution to both the problem of standardizing underwriting (quality 
control of individual loans) and the downstream problem of certifying securities (quality 
control of aggregated loan pools).  In the absence of competing market forces and with 
the weight of the federal government behind them, they have filled their function by 
keeping a firm hand on the micro-organization of loan origination.  The GSEs calculated 
a value of loans and loan pools, but their original methods were not quantitative.  
Instead, prior to the advent of scoring, their main strategy was to issue thick books of 
underwriting guidelines, stringently designed to screen for acceptable quality loans.  The 
GSE’s independently devised ratings grades, carved through their thicket of rules became 
recognized across the industry: A for prime investment and A-, B, C, and D for non-
investment grade, or less than prime.   The ratings agencies did provide their own 
systems for rating RMBS, but for the most part they confined their efforts to certifying 
asset pools outside of GSE control.  Nevertheless, although those pools might have been 
excluded by the agencies due to a variation in the underlying loan configurations, “[u]ntil 
the mid 1990’s all loans included in securitized pools in the non-conforming market were 
assumed to meet agency prime loan credit standards” (Raiter & Parisi, 2004).  The 
privately securitized loans were ‘non-prime’ (as distinguished from subprime), because 
                                                 
22 It was not until 2001 that Freddie’s products began to be independently rated by S&P.  This move is 
part of the increasingly complex intertwinement of the government sponsored and private investment 
mortgage markets described in the last section of the paper.  The testimony of Leland Brendsel, then 
Chairman and CEO of Freddie Mac before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation on this topic is available online at 
http://banking.senate.gov/01_05hrg/050801/brendsel.htm. 
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they were considered acceptable from a credit risk standpoint according to the official 
GSE rulebooks.23 
 
Each of the thousands of lenders around the country could use the GSE classification 
system for loan origination.  But the limiting property of a rule-based form24 of rating, its 
Achilles weakness, was that the interpretation of the rules on the ground “differed from 
one company to the next” (Adelson, 2004, p 5).  Due to the imperfect transmission of a 
standard meaning of the rule, what ended up happening in practice was that “one 
lender’s ‘A-' looked a lot like another lender’s ‘B’” (Raiter & Parisi, 2004, p 3).  Given the 
wide margins of uncertainty in the resulting grades, the GSEs rendered their debt 
products attractive by investing exclusively in ‘A’ quality loans and offering only a modest 
return on investment.  They further sweetened the deal by offering to share the risk 
burden with investors, guaranteeing the value of the principal (although not of the 
interest).  The agencies “promise the security holders that the latter will receive timely 
payment of interest and principal on the underlying mortgages”, and for their services 
they claim “an annual “guarantee fee” of about 20 basis points on the remaining 
principal” (Frame & White, 2007, p 85).  Under these conditions, in a market dominated 
by long term 15- and 30-year fixed interest rate loan products, it is easy to see why 
mortgage securitization was an unappealing proposition to the fast-paced, high-return 
world of private equity.   
 
 
Automating mortgage underwriting and the importation of bureau scores 
The shift away from rule-based rating towards a system of score-based rating for RMBS 
marked a fundamental change in mortgage underwriting.  However, this shift need not 
have passed through the FICO® scores, and indeed this was not Fair Isaac’s original 
inclination.  By the early 1990’s the company’s success at making and marketing bureau 
scores for the consumer credit markets was nearing its pinnacle, and the company was 
seeking new opportunities for expansion.  According to oral history25 they set their sights 
                                                 
23 For example, a loan that “conforms to traditional prime credit guidelines, although the LTV, loan 
documentation, occupancy status or property type, etc. may cause the loan not to qualify under 
standard underwriting programs” (Raiter & Parisi, 2004, p 2).  Another example is ‘jumbo loans’ which 
are loans that exceeded the government imposed size caps that were placed on the GSEs until this year. 
24 For a theoretical discussion of the notion of a form see (Thévenot, 1984). 
25 As part of this research the author has carried out interviews with two former Fair Isaac bureau score 
specialists who worked almost exclusively with the mortgage industry throughout the 1990’s.  Both were 
conducted in September, 2006. 
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on the mortgage industry, hiring professionals from the field with the idea of developing 
a specialized credit risk score for home loan underwriting.  Their analytic scouts soon 
discovered that the way credit data was brought into the mortgage underwriting was 
through an ‘RMCR’ – a residential mortgage credit report.  The practice of merged 
reporting, a system of gathering the personal data that would be fed through the GSE 
guidelines, had grown out of the days when the bureaus were small, geographically 
scattered operations and where an individual might have reports lodged in several places 
all containing relevant information.  Fair Isaac’s first instinct, therefore, was to try and 
partner with report merging firms to develop a scoring system for RMCR data.   
 
The problem with scoring the RMCRs was that the reports were infamous for being 
inherently unreliable.  To create an RMCR a mortgage broker would assemble data from 
several credit bureaus and “bring in other elements that might not necessarily be part of 
the credit bureau. So they would do a verification of employment, or verification of 
income”.  However, the process of merging reports provided commission motivated 
mortgage brokers with “the wiggle room, […] to manipulate the system to get a 
mortgage loan through”.   In addition to merging data, the other “service [brokers] did 
was to ‘cleanse’ the credit report.  They formatted it a certain way, and then if the 
mortgage worker said, ‘this information is wrong’ they would manually fix it on their 
merged credit report”.   GSEs were aware of these kinds of procedural loopholes which 
they tried to close by passing more and more supplementary rules.  So as time went on, 
the mortgage underwriting guidelines became “so rigid that if you followed them by the 
letter no one would ever originate a loan”!  The situation only reinforced the brokers’ 
motivation to engage in tactics that are as old as the industry, to invent resourceful ways 
to drive loans forward and to keep the system moving.  This meant that Fair Isaac’s 
business strategy (an isomorphic imitation of the bureau scoring project) would 
eventually stall.  The GSEs, which fixed the rules for the secondary market, would not 
accept to purchase loans underwritten by a novel score calculated from merged reports 
whose content they knew were subject to manipulation.26     
 
In the same period, the GSEs had begun their own searching for automated solutions to 
tighten the system.  Expected to balance a complex set of objectives – promoting flexible 
and affordable housing, all while maintaining their reputation for investment quality 
                                                 
26 All quotations in this paragraph are taken from the two interviews cited above. 
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products, rewarding their shareholders, and adequately controlling risk27 – the agencies 
were facing considerable pressure from all sides to gain consistent knowledge of the 
quality of loans they were purchasing from mortgage originators.  Numerous efforts were 
being made, in particular at Fannie Mae, to produce automated underwriting programs 
based on mentored artificial intelligence (AI)28.  In their original conception, these kinds 
of systems “simply converted existing underwriting standards to an electronic format” 
(Freddie Mac, 1996, Chapter 1 Improving the World’s Best Housing Finance System)29.  
They were attempts “to try to train a system to reproduce the credit decisions of a human 
underwriter (or group)”.  While simple automation “brought speed and consistency to 
the underwriting process” they could not, however, ‘optimally predict defaults’.  Industry 
reports seem to agree that by mid-1990’s “mentored AI systems had largely lost out to or 
begun to progress to statistical mortgage scoring—which brought the key advantage of 
modeling the actual likelihood of mortgage default” (Straka, 2000, p 214).  
 
A genuine ‘mortgage score’ was a statistical undertaking considerably more ambitious 
than anything a free standing analytics firm with no way to generate empirical data on 
their own could have undertaken.  Such a score would be made from a model in which 
credit data (such as bureau data) figure in alongside industry specific data on the 
characteristics of the property and the type of loan being considered, as well as 
information on income and personal finance.  With their massive stores of historical 
mortgage data the GSEs were the only institutions in a position to envisage and 
implement such a project.  It was at this point that Freddie Mac made series of crucial 
decisions that would lay down the calculative foundations for dramatic change.  Not only 
did Freddie decide to pursue statistical underwriting to the detriment of the traditional 
rule-based methods, but, secondly, rather than testing the bureau holdings for the most 
predictive combination of consumer credit data for mortgage lending, they opted to 
                                                 
27 One way of keeping housing affordable has been to offer loans to less solvent borrowers but to 
distribute risk by arranging an appropriate amount of mortgage insurance from a network of other 
federally mandated institutions such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA). 
28 General Electric Capital, a financial subsidiary of General Electric (GE), also came out with an AI 
based system (automated but not statistical) called GENIUS in the same period. 
29  In March 1996, Leland C. Brendsel testified before a subcommittee of the Senate Banking Committee 
on HUD oversight.  Part of the purpose of his appearance was to discuss “the extraordinary benefits 
that automated underwriting is bringing to home mortgage lending”.   Following the presentation, 
Senator Carol Moseley-Braun (D-Il) commissioned the agency to prepare a report “on automated 
underwriting and credit scoring and their impacts on the wide range of American families who borrow 
money to purchase homes” (Freddie Mac, 1996). The document is available online at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/moseley/mosehome.htm.  In the absence of page 
numbers I have indicated chapter titles. 
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insert consumer credit data, pre-digested in the form of numerical commercial bureau 
scores, into their nascent systems.30  Inspiration or caprice, the exact reasoning behind 
the decision to adopt the general commercial risk scores was not reported to even the 
makers of the FICO® scores whose own ambition was to design and market a new 
consumer risk calculation specifically adapted to mortgage risk.   
 
What is certain is that Freddie Mac’s primary objective was to include a reliable selection 
of consumer credit data into their automated systems in a form that could not be locally 
manipulated by the brokers.  As the giants in the field, the agency’s gesture was designed 
to simultaneously restrain the artful brokers, to provide a way to monitor credit standards 
(Schorin, Heins & Arasad, 2003), and to create a criterion of commensurability 
(Espeland, 1998) for assembling and describing prime, GSE quality MBSs.  It should be 
noted, however, that these goals might have been equally achieved by employing 
electronically transferred raw credit data purchased from the bureaus, and dissolving 
them seamlessly into the proprietary algorithms the GSEs were assembling from 
scratch.31  The astounding result was that although ‘credit data’ was only one category of 
information included in mortgage scores, it was now reduced to a discrete factor whose 
composition could potentially become invariable between automated systems.  While the 
estimates of property value, the loan-to-value ratio, personal income, and any number of 
other factors included in the mortgage might be calculated in many different ways, 
providing the industry followed Freddie’s guidelines for FICO® scores, the interpretation 
of credit risk could potentially be the same across all automated systems.32 
 
                                                 
30 In an industry review article, John Straka, then Director of Consumer Modeling at Freddie Mac reveals 
that Freddie originally endorsed both FICO® default risk scores and the competitive CNN-MDS 
bankruptcy risk scores.  But since the prediction of bankruptcy is narrow in scope than default and were 
only available from a limited number of bureaus, the latter seem to have fallen out of the picture. 
31 In fact, this is precisely what Fannie Mae has done in an attempt to remove FICO® scores from their 
models when the issue of their non-transparency became a heated political issue (Quinn, September 
2000).  Nevertheless, although Fannie Mae’s Desktop Underwriter system no longer uses FICO® scores 
as part of its internal risk assessment of individual loans, lenders must still submit scores with loan 
applications.  This strongly suggests that the scores are an essential to the process of securitization, that 
is, to describing the quality of securities products to the secondary markets, even if they are not 
employed in the loan underwriting process.  The incident confirms that there are many ways to 
adequately calculate consumer credit risk in mortgage origination, but only one calculation that allows 
buyers to compare the quality of Fannie’s products to others offerings.  This is essentially what it means 
to say that the FICO® constitutes a ‘market device’. 
32 This is true with a couple of caveats.  Firstly, since the contents of the bureaus are not exactly the 
same scores calculations for an individual file vary between the three providers.  Secondly, since the 
score shifts over time as new information is accumulated, it can change within the period of loan 
underwriting. 
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Treated side by side with the mortgage industry, Fair Isaac received a letter from Freddie 
Mac dated July 11, 199533.  Firmly grounded in the tradition of credit control-by-screening – 
that is, of seeking to lend only to those of a credit quality that made them highly unlikely 
to default – Freddie announced its decisions, including a third significant stipulation: that 
a FICO® score of 660 was the eyeball threshold for their definition of loans eligible for 
the prime investment.  Within a month Fanny Mae swiftly followed suit adopting the 
identical convention in October to demarcate their prime loans.  Industry insiders 
suggest that Fannie had no choice because they suddenly found themselves besieged by 
bad paper – that is, by loans that passed through their rule-based guidelines but which 
were adversely selected because many had already been picked over and rejected by 
Freddie34.  The decision to use FICO® as well as GSE manner of interpreting them was 
materially hardwired into the system through the release of proprietary, agency designed, 
automated underwriting software that would henceforth be used to underwrite all loans 
destined for agency purchase.  The first system in circulation was Freddie Mac’s Loan 
Prospector® which had become commercially available to all Freddie Mac lenders in 
February 1995.  Fannie Mae’s Desktop Underwriter® would soon follow suit. 
 
The FICO® feature of automated system design was politically useful when the software 
was showcased to legislators35.  A score within a score, FICO® could be neatly pulled out 
of the formula as a discrete factor in both systems; it could be isolated and independently 
interpreted as having meaning.  For example, to explain statistical automation, discreet, 
individualized FICO® scores conveniently substitute for the quality of ‘creditworthiness’ 
which government officials and the public had come to recognize as being an essential 
part of loan evaluation.  In a report to a subcommittee of the Senate Banking Committee 
the section devoted to explaining the use of commercial credit bureau scores made an 
explicit equivalence between the use of FICO® scores and an evaluation of 
‘creditworthiness’ even though the former is a shifting quality assigned statistically with 
respect to the aggregate and the latter has traditionally been considered a personal 
property of the individual often thought to be interchangeable with ‘character’.  Through 
                                                 
33 Freddie Mac Industry Letter from Michael K. Stamper, ‘‘The Predictive Power of Selected 
Credit Scores’’ July 11, 1995 as referenced in (Avery, Bostic, Calem & Canner, July 1996). 
34 Former Fair Isaac mortgage and bureau score specialist A, interview, September, 2006.  A similar 
story is reported in (Dallas, 1996). 
35 See footnote 29. 
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this analogy with known concepts (even though the commonalities were thin36) FICO® 
helped circumvent some of the technical difficulties in explaining statistical underwriting 
to lay audiences. 
 
The effect of bureau scores was not only to facilitate the evaluation and pooling of loans, 
but it also introduced a common lexicon into the industry.  The same Senate Banking 
report took great pains to explain the demarcation of a categorical break at FICO® 660. 
Freddie Mac’s independent studies showed that this score corresponded to their existing 
standards, such that “borrowers possessing weak credit profiles […] as FICO scores 
under 620”, were found to be “18 times more likely to enter foreclosure than borrowers 
with FICO scores above 660” (Freddie Mac, 1996, Chapter 3 Looking Inside Loan 
Prospector).  Given the GSE mandate to help and not hinder homeownership, 660 was 
intended to be a soft minimum score and not a firm cutoff, since the ultimate evaluation 
depended on the contribution of all of the other factors that could be weighted in 
through the larger mortgage scoring algorithm.  In this regard statistical analysis made the 
distinction between acceptable and not acceptable less immediately clear to the system 
user (Standard & Poor's, 1999, p 10).  Nevertheless, FICO® 660 rapidly became a free 
standing benchmark of prime investment grade status, recognizable among underwriters, 
securitizing bodies, investors, regulators, and later (after 200137) to informed consumers 
as well.  The overall effect was that a ‘prime lender’ could now identify as catering to 
consumers with 660 FICO® scores and above.  By default, anyone willing to develop 
products that catered to risk scores lower than a FICO® 660 would become a high-risk or 
‘subprime’ lender.38   
 
                                                 
36 As mentioned earlier, FICO® scores are behavioural scores which means that they fluctuate according 
to changing credit behaviour.  They are not based on a fixed quality of the person such as ‘character’ 
even though they were cast as a substitute for this traditional quality of the person in loan underwriting. 
37 Brokers were quick to inform consumers whose loan applications were rejected that the ‘reason’ was 
the weakness of their FICO® scores.  The discovery of the scores on the eve of the refinancing boom and 
housing bubble led to protests by consumer advocates, who argued that the scores should be released 
to the public.  In 2000 the California State legislature ruled that consumers would have a right to be 
told their scores.  Rather than risk further regulation Fair Isaac conceded and it hastily created a 
dot.com that made individuals’ scores available to individuals for a fee. 
38 Beyond the distinction between prime and subprime, FICO® scores are considered basic descriptors in 
mortgage finance.  In addition to front end pricing sheets, scores are ubiquitous component in the 
representation of a firm’s holdings in investor presentations, annual reports, SEC 8-K as well as in 10-K 
filings that fulfil the pool level disclosure reporting requirements of the SEC (1111(b)(11) of Regulation 
AB).  Finally, they are being used by economists as an analytic tool for visualising and evaluating the 
trajectory of current events.  For one example of this kind of work by Federal Reserve researchers see 
(Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, 2006), which traces the ‘evolution of the subprime mortgage 
market’ by the recording the volume of loan origination by score, but not the origins of the technical 
practices that sustain these increases. 
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 The ratings agencies adopt the scores 
It is important to note that the demarcation of subprime lending by FICO® scores is a 
distinct moment from its amplification into a functioning financial circuit.  The 
development of the subprime into a coherent network of mortgage finance in which 
securitization could take place was not a given.  It would itself have to be materialized.  
To create a circuit of subprime finance would require a proliferation of specialized 
underwriting software equally grounded around and further reinforcing the use of the 
specific brand name credit scores elected and interpreted by the GSEs.  If at any moment 
another solution to evaluating consumer risk had been incorporated into private software 
when faced with the consumer, lenders would have produced a series of disconnected 
risk assessments.  While this situation would not have precluded the emergence of 
subprime finance, it would have demanded a patch work of solutions to the problem of 
commensuration, which would have complicated the calculative picture and, much like 
the previous system of letter grades, considerably weakened the transferability of risk into 
the secondary markets. 
 
The GSEs continued to play an active role in the project of statistical automation.  Given 
the mortgage industry’s growing appetite for the swiftness of automation (although not 
necessarily for statistical underwriting39), as well as the propensity of the industry to 
follow the government agencies’ every lead, the effects of the new GSE systems would 
not stop at the borders of the government sanctioned mortgage finance.  Reports to 
government officials confirm that Freddie was eager “[t]o address lender demand for an 
automated underwriting service capable of evaluating loans in any mortgage market” and 
not only in the conventional, conforming one.  Freddie soon “joined forces with 
[Standard and Poor’s], a rating agency with significant experience evaluating subprime 
loans” (Freddie Mac, 1996, Chapter 5 Expanding Markets, Lowering Interest Rates 
Across Markets).  Standard and Poor’s (S&P) interest in Loan Prospector® was to test 
how this system for underwriting, a pre-packaged algorithm from their point of view, 
                                                 
39 In the mortgage industry the changes brought about by ‘automation’ are frequently conflated with the 
introduction of ‘analytics’ (statistical analysis) because these occurred simultaneously.  As the paper has 
described the automation of traditional rule-based underwriting could have occurred without the 
introduction of statistical underwriting.  Automation favours the introduction of statistical analysis but 
does not determine it.  There was a process of translation to brings automation and statistical 
underwriting together. 
 23
might further contribute to rating securities in a secondary market that had been 
interchangeably referred to as non-conforming or non-GSE.   
 
Under manual underwriting, most forms of rating were done at the level of the portfolio 
(at the level of a lender’s pool of loans).  In the absence of automation and scores, the 
secondary market had learned to rely on indicators designed to describe the risk level of 
the aggregated pool, such as a calculation of the average interest rate (WAC40), or the 
geographical distribution of loans across regionally distinct housing markets.  Until 1995, 
the description of the risk of each individual loan through underwriting was done with an 
entirely separate set of tools, metrics, and vocabulary than those used to describe a 
securitized pool of loans as a composite whole.  In other words, before the introduction 
of commercial bureau scores, securitizing bodies “weren’t used to looking at metrics that 
allowed you to drill so deeply into an individual consumer credit profile so effectively”.  
Individualized consumer risk scores interpreted by the GSEs and funnelled through their 
automated underwriting systems introduced a substantially “different view than what [the 
ratings agencies, securities firms and bond issuers] were accustomed to evaluating”.41 
 
Work had to be done to educate each of the securitization and ratings agencies ‘about 
how credit scores worked’.  Once Fair Isaac caught wind of the direction of change, the 
scorecard makers actively went out and “urged them to use [bureau scores] as 
components in their analysis”. 42  Some securitizing bodies were harder to convince, but 
from Fair Isaac’s standpoint S&P was an ally that ‘got it right away’.  Score-supported 
statistically based underwriting programs began to flow into and merge with the rating 
phase of securitization.  The rating agency regarded the result of these changes as 
positive in that “For the first time, a totally integrated risk management capability is 
available to loan originators, portfolio managers, investors, traders and regulators” 
(Raiter, Gillis, Parisi, Barnes, Meziani & Albergo, 1997, p 1).  For S&P the implications 
of automated underwriting extended well beyond the moment of underwriting, because 
as their research would show, “the use of credit and mortgages scores is not limited to 
the origination process” (Raiter et al., 1997, p13).  A 1997 S&P report on innovations in 
mortgage underwriting enthusiastically affirmed that in addition to rendering 
                                                 
40 WAC refers to Weighted Average Coupon.  The term coupon refers to the stated percentage rate of 
interest paid out to a security.   
41 Former Fair Isaac mortgage and bureau score specialist B, personal communication, May 24th, 2007. 
42 Former Fair Isaac mortgage and bureau score specialist B, personal communication, May 24th, 2007.  
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underwriting faster and more consistent, statistical automation could go one step further, 
giving rise “to the introduction of standardized risk grades” (Raiter et al., 1997, p 13).   
 
In sharing metrics for risk quantification, the primary and secondary markets were to be 
placed on the same calculative platform.  A recent fact sheet for S&P’s mortgage security 
rating system called LEVELS® (c1996) reflects the taken-for-granted nature of this 
change.  The program is said to combine “the power of automation with Standard & 
Poor’s time-tested ratings criteria to assess the credit risk of individual or pooled 
residential mortgage loans” (emphasis added).43  So while LEVELS® was developed to 
rate pools of securities, in a statistical regime it can equally be used to evaluate individual 
loans.  This is, in fact, what LEVELS® was designed to do.  It performs a loan-by-loan 
analysis as a means of assembling an investment quality asset pool (Raiter et al., 1997, p 
28).  Through a common use of FICO® scores the calculative field could be vertically 
integrated44, even though the chain of institutional intermediaries between borrowers and 
lenders (brokers, lenders, ratings agencies, underwriting systems, investors and so on) 
remained populated by heterogeneous and diverse economic agents.  If access to a rich 
source of mortgage data was secured, and then supplemented by commercially accessible 
consumer risk scores, a system of risk estimation could be devised that held its meaning 
as products moved fluidly from the level of individual loans up into that of aggregated 
asset pools.   
 
Several competing systems of automated statistical underwriting tools were soon in the 
works beyond the GSE models.45  While using Freddie’s Loan Prospector® or Fannie’s 
Desktop Underwriter® would facilitate the sale of loans to one of the GSEs, distinctive 
models built off of data from non-conforming, non-conventional loan specialists became 
available on the commercial market for automated systems or simply for use in-house.  
                                                 
43 S&P 2006 Product Fact Sheet: LEVELS®, Loan Evaluation and Estimates Loss System.  The document is 
available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/LEVELS2006.pdf. 
44 Vertical integration refers to the ability to communicate the quality of the loans with calculative 
continuity as they are converted from single mortgages, into pools of paper, and on into securities.  At 
every stage in the chain of transfer FICO® plays role in calculation even though the content of what the 
actors are calculating (whether to grant a mortgage, how to price a pool of loans, whether to invest in a 
security…) is different.  Vertical integration constitutes a chain of production.  This is distinct from 
horizontal integration (see next paragraph, main text) which denotes the ability to compare between 
the financial products originating from different competitive producers. 
45 Examples of early subprime underwriting systems included ‘CLUES’ (Countrywide's Loan Underwriting 
Expert System).  Countrywide Financial was one of the top 10 subprime lenders in the U.S., which 
flourished and then declined with the collapse of the recent real estate bubble.  There were several 
other systems produced by mortgage insurance firms, such as GE Capital ‘Mortgage Insurance 
Omniscore’, and Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation’s plainly named ‘Mortgage Score’.     
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Even though the valuation made of individual mortgages at the moment of underwriting 
could be methodologically aligned with the valuation of the asset pool (not to mention to 
the calculation of mortgage insurance), the existence of separate, competing systems to 
carry out this work for non-GSE destined loans impeded horizontal market integration.  
Outside of the GSE controlled market, there was an open season on innovation.  The 
hardwiring of other brands of bureau scores, or at the very least, other interpretations of 
the FICO® became distinct possibilities.  Private label securitization tools cropping up all 
over – each based on proprietary databases, built by in-house analytics teams, with 
preferences for certain statistical methods, a unique take on variables, and a distinctive 
statistical savoir faire – could be expected to produce a diverse set of algorithms and 
therefore a different set of risk calculations. 
 
Controlling the problems that flourishing calculative diversity posed was S&P’s business.  
As a certifying body, a calculating expert and a gateway to the secondary markets, it 
initiated a service to validate underwriting systems.  For system developers willing to 
submit their software creations to external evaluation, an initial development review was 
“intended to validate the soundness and statistical validity of the process used to build 
the predictive system”.  Once the data used to develop the system was received from the 
vendor S&P would perform “a series of statistical analyses that determine how well the 
system measures risk relative to actual loan performance, what key predictive variables 
have the most influence on the system’s score, and finally the observed default rates 
associated with various scores.”  In its most basic level validation checked the internal 
soundness of models.  With regards to solving the problem of horizontal coordination, 
however, these results were “then compared with those of other automated underwriting 
systems and discussed with the issuer” (Raiter et al., 1997, p 3-12).  Acting to produce 
coordination in financial markets, S&P aligned the risk outcomes of various models, by 
imposing definitions or by modifying the factors they took into account.46 
 
                                                 
46 This document explained that the process of validation and testing would begin when S&P received 
“a sample data file of a pool of approximately 10,000 to 15,000 loans randomly selected over three 
years of origination” (sent in Salomon 400 data format).  In addition, they required “1,000 bad loans 
specifically selected to augment this randomly selected group”.  The process of validation required a 
commitment to a deep fix.  The document emphasized that “for a system to enjoy validation benefits, 
Standard & Poor’s requires the vendor to agree contractually not to make any modifications to its 
system without first notifying Standard & Poor’s and to provide Standard & Poor’s with sufficient 
information to determine the impact of such modification” (Raiter et al., 1997, p 10).  The system would 
be re-validated by S&P semi-annually with fresh data, on a continuous basis. 
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Because FICO® was a standard ranking criterion that S&P itself used to test the 
soundness of an underwriting model this effectively put pressure on vendors to include 
FICO® scores in their models.  This was not merely a suggestion.   A key incentive to 
adopt FICO® then was that pools of loans tagged with an S&P validated ‘mortgage score’ 
could be more easily rated for securitization by S&P’s proprietary securities rating system.  
As a final part of validation S&P offered to “calibrate each system against a model 
portfolio of credit reports and mortgage application information to facilitate use of 
scores by Standard & Poor’s LEVELS™ [sic] model” (Raiter et al., 1997, p 9).  In 1998, 
“only 50% of Prime […] and 30% of Non-prime mortgages incorporated a credit score 
in their underwriting data file” (Raiter & Parisi, 2004).  By 2003 this had increased to 
virtually 100%.  What is more, a 1999 document to update the industry on the methods 
of rating in a post-automation era crisply announced that having “reviewed the guidelines 
established by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac”, S&P would endorsed “similar guidelines 
for selecting FICO scores included with new loans submitted for rating” (Standard & 
Poor's, 1999, p 14).  So once S&P had implemented credit bureau scores as “an integral 
factor in our underwriting review”, validation and rating gave S&P the opportunity not 
only to push the FICO® scores, but to transmit the specific interpretations of them that it 
had absorbed from its earlier collaboration with the GSEs.   
 
The Freddie Mac–S&P connection was not the only means through which the FICO® 
scores have been extended beyond the GSE market.  The FICO® had already generated a 
lot of momentum following their implementation at the GSEs, and S&P would admit it 
was in large part “[d]ue to the overwhelming utilization of credit scores” seeping into the 
industry that it became “a factor in our current credit risk analysis” (Standard & Poor's, 
1999, p 20).  The point of this account has been simply to demonstrate one channel 
through which bureau score-supported underwriting passed out of the GSE market into 
the non-GSE market. The S&P endorsement had specific consequences in opening up 
an alternative passage point to securitization that piggy-backed on GSE risk management 
practices, but moved them into alternative software systems, outside of the government 
sanctioned market, and of GSE control.  Within a proliferation of underwriting 
programs, algorithms, mortgage scores, ratings agencies, and lenders, for practical intents 
and purposes, in the mortgage industry, there are two independently functioning circuits 
of mortgage finance — the government sanctioned prime and the private label subprime.  
What divides them are information systems, their regard for risk, and product 
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development; what unites them is a common reliance and baseline interpretation of 
FICO® scores (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
The calculative shift from screening to risk  
 
The difficulty of precisely evaluating individual mortgage quality – that is, in stating credit 
risk as a firm expression transferrable across domains – is the reason why, for half a 
century, there was only weak investment activity outside of a slow and steady, federally 
chartered prime investment market.  The government sponsored agencies were a quasi-
obligatory passage point to the production and sale of investment quality residential 
mortgages backed securities because they were the only institutions in a position to 
certify the quality of loans and securities.  Held together by these institutions in their 
active role to build and implement sets of guidelines as market devices, this non-
quantitative but nonetheless calculative arrangement (Callon & Muniesa, 2005) worked to 
stabilize the quality of securities and to produce a steady secondary market.  It was on the 
authority of the institutions’ guidelines, their initiatives in interface design, as well as their 
dirty, hands-on involvement as a driver of RMBS production that the market was made.  
This paper has described how the market coordination provided by the institutionally 
made and managed guidelines (rule-based market devices) was supplanted by the 
coordination provided by commercial consumer scores (statistical market devices). What 
remains to be shown is the mechanism through which this created an avalanche of 
subprime securities investment. 
 
The GSEs guidelines embodied traditional credit production practices in which lending 
was reserved to arrangements where borrowers could be considered ‘creditworthy’ and 
all cases that failed to make this standard were rejected.  As ethnographic studies have 
shown, however, establishing creditworthiness under traditional lending was subject to 
subtle negotiations in which numerous forms of justification could come into play 
(Wissler, 1989).  What was considered ‘manipulation’ of the RMCR reports by brokers 
grew out of the permissiveness of this type of practice.  Such activities were able to 
occur, because the definition of the creditworthiness, even when filtered through rules 
and guidelines, was being flexibly assembled in the moment of loan production rather 
than being taken from fixed criteria.  It is precisely this aspect of traditional consumer 
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lending that demanded the stabilizing force of the GSEs in quality assessment.  
Nevertheless, despite its local and practical multiplicity, in the practice of control-by-
screening lenders tended to act as though they faced two (and only two) kinds of people – 
those who deserve to be worked with and those who did not.  The credit manager’s 
mandate was to minimize risk by distinguishing as clearly as possible between these 
binary groups. 
 
Empirically derived credit scoring techniques have created a new kind of consumer 
whose calculability defied conventional assumptions about the binary nature of 
creditworthiness.  Individuals viewed through statistics no longer need to be classified as 
either ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the market.  Armed with a gradated sliding scale, people all along a 
spectrum of risk can be offered specially designed products at alternative terms and 
prices.  There is nothing that precludes using the scale from being used conservatively to 
screen for high quality borrowers, as the GSEs clearly intended.47  But once in place, the 
score scale is a generator of calculative possibility.  It became a platform for creative 
design work that brought lines of risk calibrated products, both mortgages and securities, 
into existence.  The introduction of a numerical scale of consumer credit quality into 
mortgage origination permitted calculative actions that were simply unanticipated from 
within the conventional frameworks of the GSEs.  This is how control-by-screening was 
concretely edged out in the non-GSE circuit by the productivity of credit control-by-risk, 
whose characteristic is to act at the level of population, harnessing a variety of credit 
qualities through a proliferation of financial goods.  
 
In both screening and risk forms of lending there is elasticity in credit arrangements, a 
multiplicity of configurations under which lending can occur.  The first tends to create 
loan paper on a case-by-case basis, while the second distributes a variety of standardized 
products to markets segments.  Although they achieve this fit in different ways, in both 
types of credit practice the terms and the property type must be appropriately matched to 
the borrower in order to make the loan.  The difference that is most relevant to this 
paper, however, is as follows: once ‘creditworthiness’ is expressed through a statistical 
scale of gradated risk, a loan can be arranged for people who are of low credit quality; 
that is, for those who would not be considered particularly ‘creditworthy’ from a 
                                                 
47 It is not incidental that the original Fair, Isaac scorecard was actually designed to do control-by-
screening.  In its original conception the flexibility of the scoring tool acted as a switch that allowed 
credit managers at finance companies to adjust the risk level at which floor personnel were screening. 
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screening point of view. Screening is a risk minimizing strategy; statistical lending is a risk 
management strategy, that is, one that embraces risk (Baker & Simon, 2002).  It is this 
displacement, the result of an innovative fusion between FICO® and the ratings agencies, 
that catapulted the ‘subprime’ from a specialized low profile area of non-conforming 
lending and into a burgeoning financial market.   It is through the rise of this risk 
management apparatus that subprime loans escaped the books to become the raw 
materials for mass produced financial products destined for mainstream consumption. 
 
That the subprime has developed as a distinct financial space, yet one positioned with a 
high degree of congruence to the prime, is an historical phenomenon produced by the 
particularities of the commercial technology whose history has been presented here.  
Private label sources did not invade GSE territory.  Instead, by borrowing but modifying 
the GSEs’ very own market making tool kits they have built their endeavour up beside it.  
Specialized lenders can and do underwrite conventional loans to prime eligible 
individuals48, yet they have clearly preferred to exploit more lucrative subprime lending 
opportunities.  So although the existence of information that provides an incremental 
and linear ranking of risk could theoretically have given rise to a confluent market space, 
open to an infinite variety of competitive decisions on how to segment the mortgage 
market, what we find instead is the entrenchment of a fairly tangible break.  The binary 
partition is the conservative imprint of the GSE’s upon the FICO® technology for the 
purposes of screening for prime market candidates.  Once the institutional benchmark 
for how the scores should be used was hardwired into the material infrastructure of 
underwriting and rating software, it ran deeply enough in the infrastructure to cleave the 
lending space in two.   
 
These spaces are distinguished by their distinctive risk management practices.  While the 
GSEs have tended to stick to their ‘plain vanilla’ prime market loans after the adoption 
of bureau scores, a new breed of lending outfits continued to work with the scores to 
                                                 
48 As the crisis has unfolded the consumer fairness issue is to assess when a subprime loan is justified and 
when it is predatory.  Many prime eligible borrowers did take out subprime loan products during the 
bubble.  While consumers in disadvantaged areas may have done so because they had greater 
geographical access to subprime lenders, others were attracted to these loans by their lower monthly 
payment schemes which could be advantageous especially when making multiple property investments.  
Treasury Secretary Paulson’s proposed plan (unveiled in December 2007) which included freezing 
interest rates on adjustable rate mortgages, but only for individuals with credit scores of 660 or more, is 
a perfect example of how FICO® scores are being redeployed to refine and justify the distinctions 
between prime and subprime treatment through ongoing policy intervention.  Such decisions reduce 
ambiguities in the definition of subprime by strictly aligning a category of loan products with a category 
of borrowers.  The consequences of this on market mobility have yet to be discussed. 
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innovate techniques of granular risk-based pricing with hundreds of potential price levels 
(Collins, Belsky & Case, 2004).  In 1996, a full ten year before the onset of the 
contemporary credit crisis, First Franklin Financial49 CEO and co-founder, William D. 
Dallas, published an ambitious article entitled ‘A time of innovation’, in the trade journal 
Mortgage Banker.  He stated that it was clearly “unsuitable for lenders to sell what is truly a 
subprime loan (loans that fail to meet secondary market agency standards) to the 
secondary market corporations” (Dallas, 1996).  Having engaged with Fair Isaac, Freddie 
Mac, and Standard & Poor’s, he enthusiastically predicted the growth of a subprime 
business arguing that “there are much higher margins and reduced risk when you 
properly price a subprime loan instead of mispricing it and jamming it into the prime 
pipeline” (Dallas, 1996).  First Franklin’s slogan –‘Score it, price it, close it’ – captures the 
élan of score infused private label finance.  With FICO® poised to act as a vertical bridge 
between the primary and secondary markets, it was a short step from systematically 
originating subprime mortgage loans, to moving these up through the ratings agencies 
and into investment portfolios. 
 
A 2004 Joint Center for Housing Studies (Harvard University) working paper, by two 
employees of Standard & Poor’s, has provided evidence that this separation is empirically 
meaningful (Raiter & Parisi, 2004).  Examining the relationship between FICO® scores 
and mortgage coupons (interest rates) from data in S&P’s proprietary database of 9.3 
million residential mortgages, the study concluded that rational risk based pricing had 
become more refined and more expansive since 1998.   By ‘rational’ they meant that that 
the interest rate of the loans increase as the FICO® scores decreased, but also that “the 
coupon rate charged on the loan at origination […] translated into true dollar costs over 
the life of the loan” (p 20).  What is perhaps more significant is the finding that “risk-
based pricing is more efficiently applied in the nonprime arena” (emphasis added) which 
implied that “lenders are more concerned about accurately pricing default risk in a 
market segment that is perceived to be of higher risk than in the prime” (p 18).  Vaunting 
the qualities of LEVELS® the paper drew attention to the fact that while the GSEs 
“would provide one mortgage rate for all borrowers qualifying for a particular product, 
                                                 
49 1st Franklin Financial Corporation operates in Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina, Mississippi and 
Louisiana.  In the heart of the real estate bubble First Franklin was bought by Merrill Lynch as a 
‘subprime specialist’ for 1.3 billion, an acquisition that would weight heavily on the firm only a year 
later as the market collapsed (Keoun, October 17, 2007). 
 31
originators in the non-conforming market could provide a range of coupons dependent 
on their ability to stratify risk” (p 6). 50   
 
These alternative dynamics of subprime lending are now taken to be matters-of-fact in 
the banking industry.  The FRB’s Commercial Bank Examination Manual and the Bank 
Holding Company Supervision Manual both observe that a FICO of 660 is the reported 
industry benchmark for the subprime lending (consumer credit and mortgages) although 
they are careful to indicate that the government guidance does not endorse any “single 
definitive cutoff point for subprime lending” (Federal Reserve Board, 1994a, p 11; 
1994b, p11) 51.  The Commercial Manual goes on to frankly state that “Subprime loans 
command higher interest rates and loan fees than those of offered to standard-risk 
borrowers” (Federal Reserve Board, 1994b, p 2).  As long as lenders charge prices that 
are high enough to cover the higher loan-loss rates and overhead costs, associated with 
this business then the subprime can be expected to be profitable.  Moreover, this manual 
points out that “The ability to securitize and sell subprime portfolios at a profit while 
retaining the servicing rights makes subprime lending attractive to a larger number of 
institutions, further increasing the number of subprime lenders and loans” (p 2).  Indeed, 
under contemporary conditions, whose achievement has been traced in this paper, it does 
not seem at all astounding that securitization would be infinitely more attractive in the 
subprime than in the prime.   
 
 
 
                                                 
50 It is perhaps not incidental that the first author, Frank Raiter, was, as managing director of Residential 
Mortgage Group within S&P Structured Finance unit, a key advocate of credit scoring during the period 
of industry automation.  The study discussed here is perhaps somewhat tautological in that it uses FICO® 
scores to show that the market is rational, when it is arguable the rationale of the FICO® that has made 
the market able to perform this rationality. 
51 The FRB examination manuals provide guidance to supervisory personnel in planning and conducting 
bank inspections, although they are not legal documents. 
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The GSE paradox52 
 
During the housing bubble the mortgage market grew due to a proliferation of lending 
that did not meet the agencies’ risk management criteria because the GSEs’ ‘non-accepts’ 
– the very loan categories they eliminated and deemed hors du marché – became private-
label’s main market.  The result is a startling paradox: “Fannie and Freddie have become 
the opposite of what they were.  They are now lenders to safe markets, while private 
institutions serve markets that were once liquidity-deprived” (Thornbert, August 24, 
2007).  So although the GSEs exist to better attract capital to the market, as Richard 
Syron, Chairman and CEO of Freddie Mac pointed out to the recent Congressional 
Committee on Financial Services inquiry, today, “Numerous investors compete 
vigorously for mortgage assets” (Syron, March 15, 2007).  The record of Syron’s 
testimony indicates that mortgage risk is, in all actuality, widely dispersed among many 
investors.  For the duration of the housing boom, it was investment capital that 
generously funded a proliferation of mortgage options, and attended to the very groups 
that are arguably most in need of ownership assistance according to the mandate of the 
GSEs. 
 
The central observation is that “the issuers of private-label residential MBS are holding 
the aces that were once held by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac” (England October 2006).  “Once a junior – but powerful – player in 
the market private-label residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) are now the 
leading force driving product innovation and the net overall volume of mortgage 
origination” (England October 2006).  As the composition of loan originations moves 
towards non-standard products and as the secondary market attracts less risk restricted 
firms willing to fund those loans, “[the GSE’s] share of U.S. residential mortgage debt 
outstanding (MDO) has dropped significantly, while the MDO share for competing 
                                                 
52 The account of GSE involvement in the crisis has taken a dramatic turn since these were place under 
conservatorship (see footnote 17).  The paradox described here has all but dropped out of the picture.  
Propagated by the publicity of federal hearings (“Federal Responses to Market Turmoil”, Committee of 
the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, September 24, 2008), and heightened by the drama of 
electoral politics, new arguments have emerged charging that it was in fact the GSEs that underwrote 
the mass of subprime loans at the root of the default crisis. These claims place fault squarely on 
Democrats for resisting greater oversight during the 2004 Congressional Hearings into accounting 
practices at Fannie Mae, as well as for supporting policies that encouraged GSE involvement in the 
project of affordable housing.  It is important to note, however, that Fannie Mae’s direct involvement in 
underwriting subprime lending began late in the game, in 2006, as an effort to stem the erosion of their 
market share (Hilzenrath, August 19, 2008).  Caught up in the dynamics of the new market configuration 
looping back upon them, it is arguably at this moment that the GSEs absorbed some forms of control-by-
risk developed in the parallel subprime markets. 
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investors has grown dramatically” (Syron, March 15, 2007, p 30)53.  Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae continue to be “large forces in the mortgage market”, but it is becoming 
widely recognized that they are playing “a small and diminishing role in the subprime 
business as large Wall Street institutions and hedge funds have become more active” 
(Bajaj, February 28, 2007).54   
 
Some recent production figures from the heart of the real estate boom drive home the 
magnitude and acceleration of these changes.  By 2003, private-label accounted for 24 
percent, or some $586 billion of RMBSs.  At that time, most of the loans involved were 
‘jumbo prime mortgages’, that is, mortgages considered to involve a low credit risk but 
whose size would exceed the purchasing limits imposed on the GSEs in their charters.  
In only the first two quarters of 2006, however, private-label issuance had grown to 
nearly the same amount as in all of 2003 – to $577 billion – and their percentage share of 
the market had leapt up to 57 percent.55  What is even more striking is how these figures 
are distributed by type of market or market segment.  While the issuance showed a 
healthy increase from $57 billion (Q1-03) to $67 billion (Q1-06) in the prime segment, it 
had more than tripled – from $37 billion (Q1-03) to $114 billion (Q1-06) – in the 
‘subprime’. It has further been reported that in 2003, “62 percent of originations were 
conventional, conforming loans underwritten to GSE guidelines.  By contrast, in the first 
half of 2006, only 35 percent of mortgages were conventional, conforming loans” 
(England October 2006).   
 
In the last decade private capital has been tripping over itself – or so it appeared – to 
become a handmaiden to the American Dream.  The subprime collapse has turned the 
tables back again, and the GSEs are now taking a sound scolding from their masters in 
Congress for having left vulnerable populations, the very groups most in need of 
temperate government assistance to the Wall Street wolves.  In its defense, Syron has 
                                                 
53 Document available online at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/about/policy/pdf/syron3-15-
07finaltestimonypdf.pdf.  
54 In addition to facing new sources of competition, the GSEs have been besieged by harsh accusations 
of ‘creative bookkeeping’.  In response to these affairs, H.R. 1461 the Federal Housing Reform Act of 
2005 was passed on October 26, 2005.  The Federal Housing Reform Act of 2007 introduced March 9 
(H.R. 1427), was being debated at the time of writing.  Bills have included provision to force the 
Agencies to raise capital reserves and to divert funds towards affordable housing in high-risk groups.  
Although the bill does not specify how high-risk will be assessed, an educated guess is that this will be 
determined at least in part by the participation of FICO® scores or some other bureau tool.  The 
potential repercussion of these and other capital requirement to the agencies’ potential hold on even the 
prime market is clearly discussed in (Frame & White, 2007). 
55 Source: Inside Mortgage Finance Database, reported in (England October 2006). 
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diplomatically pointed out that “Freddie Mac’s business is confined to the residential 
mortgage market – in good times and bad.  We can’t diminish our support for this 
market when there are more profitable investments to be had elsewhere”.  Unlike the 
private equity funds, hedge funds, non-bank financial institutions, the GSEs need to 
maintain more conservative portfolios because they have a “statutory requrement to 
provide liquidity to the nation’s mortgage market” (Syron, March 15, 2007).  Perhaps the 
final blow of irony is that as the crisis began, the GSEs themselves were caught holding 
some $170 billion in private-label subprime securities56, products which they would never 
have underwritten themselves.  Like so many others, they had purchased these as 
investments because they were triple-A rated by the ratings agencies57. 
 
 
Discussion: Market devices as agents of change 
It seems to make obvious sense today that lenders should be moving all kinds of loans 
into the capital markets.  High-risk loans flying off the books – this is indeed as Ben 
Bernanke has put it, a ‘great sea change’ from the days when the GSEs were the 
chartered institutions necessary to facilitate mortgage finance in a risk minimizing 
fashion.  Rather than taking simplified dynamics of ‘supply and demand’ or ‘risk versus 
return’ as naturalized backdrops of this type of change, this paper has proposed that we 
take the practical configuration of these economic principles in distributed material 
devices as an object of investigation.  Instead of searching for accelerations of financial 
activity in the ideas and motivations of market participants this means examining the 
moments when the material content of industry practices have changed.  These changes 
have generated novel pathways of microeconomic market participation which have 
gradually become amplified, through continuous ongoing innovation, into 
macroeconomic circuits of capital flow.   
 
Adapting tools from science and technology studies and the social studies of accounting 
to the social study of finance, this paper has presented a calculatively sensitive account of 
the origins of the subprime mortgage market.  It has traced the movement of commercial 
                                                 
56 This figure was reported in an Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) news release 
available online at: http://www.ofheo.gov.  
57 A statement to this effect was made by James B. Lockhard III, director of the OFHEO at the Federal 
Reserve Bank OF Chicago’s 44th Annual Conference on Bank Structure & Competition, at the luncheon 
address, May 16, 2008 (author’s field notes). The increasingly complex relationship between the GSEs 
and the ratings agencies manifests itself in numerous ways as indicated earlier in footnote 22. 
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consumer credit analytics into mortgage underwriting as a means of demonstrating that 
what might look like the spontaneous rise of a ‘free’ capital market divested of direct 
government intervention, has been thoroughly embedded in the concerted movement of 
technological apparatuses.  When dealing with the recent breakdown of this financial 
circuit, the approach replaces ‘transgressions of economic common sense’58 with the 
‘generative calculative practices of economic agency’ (Callon & Law, 2003; Preda, 2006; 
Rose & Miller, 1992).  In this view, financial phenomena are no longer categorised as the 
results of correctness or falsity, of rationality or irrationality, so much as they are analysed 
symmetrically according to how financial activities are framed, constituted and brought 
into being – until as it may happen, their own internal consistency brings them to the 
point of overflow and collapse (MacKenzie, 2006). 
 
FICO® scores can therefore be said to have reconfigured mortgage markets, putting into 
place a space of potential high-risk investment action.  The intriguing plot twist is that 
these scores were introduced into the mortgage industry by risk-adverse government 
agencies.  When the GSEs adopted the FICO® they interpreted scores conservatively, 
assuming they could be used to reinforce the binary spirit of the traditional form of credit 
control-by-screening.  But because the tool had inscribed within it the possibility of making 
financially meaningful risk management calculations, it enabled the rise of a new form of 
financial activity: credit control-by-risk.  As FICO® scores were hardwired across a number 
of independent information processing infrastructures they aligned the calculative 
activities of distinct groups of actors.  The new control was not exploited uniformly; it 
proliferated outside of the government facilitated market through developments in 
private automated loan evaluation software, giving rise to a vibrant and invested 
subprime.   
 
What the exercise of tracking shows is that the scores have not achieved these effects 
abstractly or from a distance.  Shifting from one form of market calculation to another 
requires a gradual and continuous process of material extension in which scores have 
travelled long distances, lodge themselves in many places, and participated in traceable 
processes.  Thus it is not quantification, model building, or numerical expression as 
information per se, that should be linked to increased channels for high-risk investment in 
                                                 
58 The reference to ‘transgressions’ points to both the errors that are attributed to having followed 
economic ideas too closely, as well as to those that are said to result from overriding a naturalized 
economics. 
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the mortgage industry.  Nor can responsibility for the changes be flatly pinned on the 
GSEs for having adopted the scores in the first place.  It is the pioneering journey of 
FICO® scores throughout the industry that has integrated, assembled, and aligned 
different market agents.  The integrity of the chain – which might have been truncated at 
any point along its length had an alternative solution or even another interpretation of 
these scores been adopted – is what has rendered these divers agents capable of engaging 
together in a distinctive and coherent, globe spanning circuit of productive subprime real 
estate finance.   
 
This is not a story of technological diffusion because continuous distribution, adaptation, 
discovery and innovation have mattered.  The scores did not diffuse unhindered, but 
passed through and were adjusted at several institutional passage points.  Nor is it a story 
about technology selection where a technical method is purposively promoted by overtly 
politicized actors because it coheres to the needs of a greater particular movement or 
political program (for this kind of account see (Burchell, Clubb & Hopwood, 1985)).  
Instead, the political outcomes of this case (broadly speaking) have unfolded within the 
messy and uncertain process of constituting the scores as appropriate tools for mortgage 
finance.  Political change results from the multiple local movements that remake the 
technology into a market device.  In this story a risk management apparatus becomes in 
and of itself the diffused principle of coordination between groups with different 
interests and objectives. This is why an overarching or driving ‘discourse’ or preexisting 
‘rationality’ is notably absent – because actors who are not discursively aligned at the 
outset end up being organized through shared risk management practices.59   
 
A technological platform for common calculation can be the carrier of profound political 
displacement and of astounding economic change.  But since statistical solutions are 
naturally multiple the achievement of such a platform has to be taken as an analytic 
puzzle not as a causal force.  As a form of modelling for simplifying and disambiguating 
through a process of abstraction (Rosenblueth & Wiener, 1945), calculative problems can 
be framed in multiple ways, and calculative solutions are constantly threatened by the 
introduction of alternative possibilities (Callon, 1998b; Callon & Law, 2003).  From Fair 
Isaac’s point of view the impetus for selecting their product across the board is its 
scientific superiority within a competitive market for scores.  Yet as we have seen, the 
                                                 
59 The insightful observation that accounting systems can participate in the creation of their own 
organizational contexts is discussed in (Hopwood, 1983). 
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constitution of this staying power is deeply entangled with the activities of government 
and ratings agencies whose endorsements, independent research initiatives, 
interpretations and automated systems greatly contributed to re-qualifying and 
singularising (Callon et al., 2002) this particular brand of consumer risk scores such that it 
became a calculatively effective risk management product for another market situation. 
Once this calculative tool was stabilized in and as an infrastructure it intensified and 
generated downstream complexity60 as it made an alternative form of co-ordinated and 
coherent collective decision making possible. 
 
As devices, both the GSE’s exclusionary rulebooks and rank-bearing FICO® scores have 
proved workable solutions to the problem of rendering financial action possible.  What is 
remarkable is that in achieving their objectives through the assembly of different tools, 
methods and organizational arrangements, each one assembles mortgage markets with 
distinctive qualities of financial action.  Agency guidelines are one distributed market 
making device whose way of achieving common calculability is actively reinforced by the 
GSEs, which take responsibility for checking behind the application of guidelines and 
who reassure investors by taking up the central position in the securitization process.   
Moreover, the GSEs have a direct stake in financial outcomes as holders of their own as 
well as private label securities.  Knotted together in this way, GSE devices have 
performed a concentrated low-risk mortgage market with a limited set of explicitly and 
implicitly guaranteed investment products.   
 
The shift towards circulating credit bureau FICO® scores, on the other hand, has 
performed high-risk markets with differentiated and structured products.  Like the GSE 
guidelines, commercial bureau scores are also constituted by institutional arrangements 
(Poon, 2007).  Yet, unlike the guidelines whose efficacy is intimately tied to their ongoing 
association with the authority of the GSEs, bureau scores enter exchange activity as 
detached pieces of scientific calculation that circulate independently of their makers.  
Through the commercial transactions in which they are bought and sold, scores are 
                                                 
60 A topic entirely omitted in this paper that is crucial to the unfolding of the eventual subprime induced 
crash is the rise of structured finance, credit enhanced securities with what are called ‘senior 
subordinated structures’.  These investment vehicles are built with tiers of mutually insuring, differentially 
graded tranches that layer risk unequally at different rates of return in the design of the product.  In the 
crisis it was the junior classes of these products held by hedge funds that degraded first as they are built 
to do, but not as rapidly as they did.  That the single class pass-through gave way to these structured 
securities after 1997 (Adelson, 2004) strongly suggests that the adoption of commercial credit scores 
played a role in the advancement of structuring.  This paper touches upon only the immediate innovation 
that followed behind the introduction of FICO® scores. 
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emancipated from the conditions of their own production, an effect that contributes to 
their very appeal (Latour, 1987).  The result is a curious distinction: Despite the fact that 
distributed market devices play a crucial role in generating the qualities of both circuits of 
mortgage finance, prime lending, facilitated by the visible hand of accountable 
government sponsored enterprises, is considered to be ‘regulated’ or ‘managed’; while 
subprime lending, sustained by the invisible hand of economic information, is described 
as the culmination of independent decision making by economic agents who are 
‘dispersed’ and ‘free’.     
 
 
Conclusion 
This research is part of a broader project that seeks to draw attention to the introduction 
of default risk, established through new calculative apparatuses, in changing the nature of 
U.S. consumer finance.61  By engaging with empirical details of how risk management 
tools are transmitted on the ground, the work emphasizes that shared forms of 
calculation do not arise spontaneously but must be established progressively through 
their insertion into local practices.  Some may find it a strange conclusion, but the 
consequence of this observation is as follows: inherently superior qualities are not 
necessarily what allow some calculations to rise above the many other solutions to the 
problem of assessing risk.  It is the idiosyncratic process of being reworked and 
implemented which might enable specific calculations to acquire a unique positioning 
that renders them effective agents of collective financial action.   
 
In the case discussed here, the infrastructural qualities of FICO® scores in mortgage 
finance were engineered through successive movement and translation as they spread 
across the industry.  It is important to remember that at the outset, credit bureau scores 
were considered a sub-optimal, if not inappropriate tool for mortgage underwriting, by 
scoring experts at Fair Isaac.  Nonetheless they were a convenient solution to the 
problem of controlling credit quality, one that was perhaps cheaper and faster to 
implement than doing R&D.  Adopted by Freddie Mac, commercially available credit 
scores entered into the mortgage industry to do a humble job of reinforcing extant 
practices of control-by-screening.  The distinctive mark of 660 is a testimony of these limited 
intentions.  Subsequently taken up by Fannie Mae, FICO® became part of a united GSE 
                                                 
61 It is noteworthy that the U.K.’s commercial bureau scoring system is the most similar to that of the U.S., 
largely due to the influence of Fair Isaac. 
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solution to evaluating credit quality.  Scores were hardwired into proprietary automated 
underwriting software, and rapidly became a recognized piece of loan-making machinery.  
Facilitated, for example, by an enthusiastic partnership between Freddie Mac and S&P, 
FICO® was also hardwired into private automated underwriting software.  In both 
financial circuits bureau scores smoothed out production.  They provided vertical 
integration by allowing the quality of single loans and pools of loans to be expressed by 
the same risk metric.  They also provided horizontal integration in that investors could 
now use the description in terms of FICO® to compare the value of complexly 
constructed securities. 
 
The scores bubbled with generative capacities, providing fresh material for financial 
innovation as they propagated throughout the industry.  An empirical demonstration that 
the qualities of calculation are not deterministic, but must be acted upon and developed, 
the paper further describes how this potential was taken up differentially by the GSE and 
private label players.  In the hands of the GSEs statistical scores continued to be used as 
a conservative screening device for selecting prime quality loans; in the hands of private 
label, however, they were used to developed risk managed products that exploited the 
newly risk quantified space of non-GSE lending.  Coordinated by FICO®, a new regime 
of control-by-risk emerged.  As exotic mortgage products and increasingly structured 
securities proliferated, the ‘non-prime’ – by definition excluded from investment, was 
transformed into ‘the subprime’ – a place of elevated return on investment. In the 
subprime, an alternative circuit of mortgage production supported by the rise of direct 
retail channels to consumers62 and bond rating agencies, capital players could now 
circumvent authoritative government sponsored apparatuses.  They calculatingly poured 
money directly into asset backed paper based on consumer real estate.   
 
As investment capital flooded into housing, it crashed into two pillars:  The fabled 
American Dream of homeownership, and the reputation of real estate as a safe and stable 
sector.  These golden images, foraged in the days when the GSEs’ rule-based market 
making apparatus dominated mortgage finance, carried over untarnished even as 
information infrastructure was changing the nature of lending industry under everyone’s 
feet.  Given that the mandate of the GSEs was to facilitate home ownership, it should 
                                                 
62 As of October 2008, twenty two of the thirty largest specialized subprime operations had been shut 
down, gone bankrupt, or been seized by the FDIC (i.e. Indymac and WaMu).  It is noteworthy that other 
casualties of subprime involvement such as Bear Sterns, were too small as players to make this list. 
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come as no surprise then that the success of subprime was initially heralded as a solution 
to the problem of affordable housing.  The tensions that make democratic lending a 
puzzle in a regime of control-by-screening, seemed to dissolve away in a regime of control-by-
risk.  Yet what went overlooked was that the transition from low-risk exclusionary to 
high-risk inclusionary lending practices had transformed the very nature of 
homeownership.  It intensified competition and raised properties prices by equipping 
more home buyers across the nation with immediate purchasing capability.  Moreover, 
faced with complex choice sets it demanded that everyday people exercise degrees of 
financial judgment that had heretofore not been required of them.   
 
Readers searching for a smoking gun will no doubt find this account of the origins of 
subprime finance tremendously disappointing.  It is admittedly counterintuitive to 
consider the onset of crisis from anything but the perspective of fault or error.  But 
although it may be true, to take one example, that lax income statements ran rampant in 
the subprime business, it could also be expected that the age-old tactics of brokers would 
take on a renewed fervour as lending boomed.  Misstated income is not new; what is new 
are the infrastructural conditions under which these misstatements have occurred.  To 
belabour the point of underwriting error is to forget that the rationale of statistical 
automation was to minimize and overcome the virulence of precisely this kind of well-
recognized ground level activity.  A provocative hypothesis would be that such error 
could be expected to proceed unchecked and to increase exactly as it ostensibly did, once 
muted at the systemic level.63  In a world where multiple calculations and multiple frames 
of meaning are possible, what is an error at one moment can quickly become a non-error 
by the criteria of another, and vice versa.  It is only by retreating to the rigid view of 
worthiness in control-by-screening that actions occurring in a regime of control-by-risk can be 
criticized as fundamental ‘errors’.  This is the flaw of ‘error’ as a social scientific concept 
in situations that are in motion: it can only be fixed retrospectively and defined from an 
analytically external point of view.   
 
This paper has taken an altogether different approach to the subprime crisis.  It has 
suggested that the explosion of the subprime was not caused by a sheer increase in 
lending volume stemming from irrational, fraudulent, or extra-governmental activity, but 
by the super-coordination of market actors’ decision-making around stabilized frames of 
                                                 
63 For a detailed enumeration by a practitioner of the underwriting battles that went on between 
brokers and subprime mortgage wholesalers see (Bitner, 2008). 
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risk provided by third party commercial consumer analytics companies.  If risk is tied to 
the capacity to make decisions as Millo and Holzer (Millo & Holzer, 2005) have cogently 
suggested – that is to say, a decision not to lend at all is a zero risk decision – then the 
unfolding volatility of subprime finance as well as its amplified supply and demand would 
not be related to having misjudged or underestimated risk, so much as it would be 
generated by economic agents acting upon newly constituted risk-bearing entities 
materialized, shaped and described by FICO® credit bureau scores.  It was not from a 
dearth of information (information asymmetry), but from the presence of innovative forms 
of digitized consumer risk scores that the infamous model of originate-to-distribute, of 
creating profit by pushing loans in volume onto the secondary markets,  was put into 
practice.  In this view, the protracted globe-spanning credit crisis beginning in 2007 
should be studied first and foremost as the temporary achievement of a tightly calculated 
system of financial order, not as disorder.  The contemporary financial turbulence is the 
empirical result of having engaged with novel conditions of calculative possibility.   
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